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1 Introduction

is a comparison of the forecasting and dummy variable
approaches, which we define in Section 3. Our analysis
underscores that these competing approaches to computing benchmark damage estimates often yield similar
estimates, despite seemingly different implementation
schemes.
We are not the first to consider the advantages and
disadvantages of each of these methodologies.3 However,
we believe many of the results comparing the forecasting and dummy variable approaches, while straightforward, are underappreciated. In order to focus on the
central methodological issues, we begin in Section 2 by
describing the basic regression framework and defining
the object of interest. In Section 3, we discuss alternative
versions of the dummy variable approach, offering in the
process a suggestion as to how to compare the various
methodologies. We also describe the forecasting approach
and compare it to the dummy variable approach. Section 4
presents three propositions that directly compare the
dummy variable and forecasting approaches. The propositions tend to support the use of the dummy variable
approach over the forecasting approach. However, there
are particular advantages associated with the forecasting
approach, and these are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6,
we return to the dummy variable approach, discussing
some important model specification issues. In Section 7,
we offer an example that illustrates the differences
between the various approaches. Section 8 concludes.

The quantitative evaluation of monetary damages from
alleged antitrust violations occupies a central place in
antitrust litigation. The two most common approaches to
evaluating damages involve the use of yardsticks and benchmarks.1 In a typical yardstick approach, one compares prices
during the period in which the antitrust violation is believed
to have had an effect (the “impact period”) to prices in other
markets that are deemed to be reasonably comparable to the
market at issue. In contrast, the benchmark approach evaluates prices only in the market at issue, comparing prices in
the impact period to available prices before and/or after the
alleged period of impact (the “control period”).
In this paper, we offer a detailed evaluation of the
benchmark approach to damages. We have found the
benchmark approach to be the most commonly used
damages methodology. To focus the analysis, we assume
that the antitrust violation at issue involves price fixing.
We also assume that the appropriate legal remedy involves
overcharges rather than lost profits.2 Our particular focus

Let Yt denote the price of the product in question, Xt a
vector of exogenous covariates (e.g., demand and cost
variables), and Dt a dummy variable indicating the period
of the alleged conspiracy, i.e., the impact or conspiracy
period.

1 Alternative approaches involve variations on the yardstick approach, such as a comparison of rates of return and/or profit margins
across industries.
2 For a broad discussion of these alternative measures, see Hovenkamp [2005, section 17.5(a)].

3 See, for example, Salkever (1976), Fisher (1980), Rubinfeld and
Steiner (1983), Rubinfeld (1985, 2008), and Higgins and Johnson
(2003). See especially White, Marshall, and Kennedy (2006); those
authors strongly prefer the forecasting approach and are highly critical of the dummy-variable approach.

2 The Basic Model
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We assume that there are data both before and during
the alleged conspiracy period. Let T0 denote the last
period prior to the beginning of the alleged conspiracy, so
that t = 1, 2, …, T0 corresponds to the pre-conspiracy control
period and t = T0+1, T0+2,…, T0+T1 to the conspiracy period.
Define the total number of periods as T = T0+T1. We assume
throughout that price is generated according to
Yt = α+β′Xt+δDt+γ′DtXt+εt(1)
where εt is a mean zero residual that is uncorrelated with
Xt, Dt, and DtXt, i.e., 0 = E[ εt ] = E[ εt Xt ] = E[ εt Dt ] = E[ εt Dt Xt ].
This relatively general specification takes into account the
possibility that the alleged conspiracy will affect price
directly, as given by δDt (e.g., through an increase in price
at each point in time in the damage period). However, it
also takes into account the possibility that the effect of the
conspiracy will be felt through one or more of the covariates, as given by the term γ′DtXt. This allows the effect of Xt
on Yt to differ between the control period and the impact
period. This can be a desirable feature, for example, in an
industry and time period where excess profits are being
dissipated over time through market entry.
We assume that the conspiracy does not cause
changes to the covariates. When the covariates are caused
by the conspiracy, neither the forecasting approach nor
the basic dummy variable approach is appropriate if
applied using the model in Equation (1). These considerations importantly affect the choice of covariates. Note,
however, that assuming the conspiracy does not cause the
covariates to change does not rule out the possibility that
the covariates are correlated with the conspiracy. Indeed,
we focus on the case where the covariates have different
levels during the pre-conspiracy period than during the
conspiracy period.4
We focus on what is to be done when the model in (1)
is appropriate and there are sufficient data to apply either
approach.5 For simplicity, we assume that the period in
which there are antitrust damages and the conspiracy
period are identical. Allowing for the two to be different would add some complexity to the specification, but
would not change any of the fundamental points to be
made in the paper.
The model in Equation (1) can be thought of as a
model of counterfactual outcomes, namely
4 The case where the covariates have equal average levels between
the pre-conspiracy period and the conspiracy period is discussed in
Higgins and Johnson (2003); see their assumption 4.
5 There may be too few observations under conspiracy conditions
to estimate the parameters α+δ and β+γ using the conspiracy period
alone.

Yt(1) = α+δ+(β+γ)′Xt+ut(2)
Yt(0) = α+β′Xt+vt(3)
where Yt(1) is price under conspiracy conditions, Yt(0)
is price under non-conspiracy conditions, and ut and
vt are mean zero residuals that are uncorrelated with
Xt (Rubin 1974; Imbens 2004). We additionally impose
the assumptions that ut and vt are uncorrelated with Dt,
which then implies our earlier orthogonality assumption
E[ εt Dt ] = 0. 6
Under this formulation, observed price is
Yt = DtYt(1)+(1–Dt)Yt(0) and the price residual from Equation (1) is εt = Dtut+(1–Dt)vt = vt+Dt(ut–vt). The formulation in
Equations (2) and (3) is useful for understanding some of
the conceptual points we raise below.
A damages award in litigation is typically based on
estimated aggregate overcharges, as measured here by
the difference in revenues under conspiracy conditions
and under non-conspiracy conditions. To simplify, we
assume that costs are unaffected by the conspiracy. To
define this estimand explicitly, denote quantity as Qt.
Note that quantity will not be included as a covariate,
because of controversies over exogeneity – the set of
covariates is restricted to be those variables exogenous
to the conspiracy. Although quantity is excluded from
the regression, it may nonetheless be correlated with
some of the covariates and with price. Indeed, this may
occur even if the conspiracy did not cause changes
to quantity. Average overcharges are aggregate overcharges relative to the number of time periods. Multiple
consistent estimators are available for average overcharges, and we focus on the issues associated with the
estimation of the relevant parameter or parameters. The
population parameter corresponding to average overcharges is
OC * = E[ DtQt { Yt (1) −Yt (0) } ]



(4)

which can be thought of as the product of the true
average overcharge during the conspiracy period, or
E[ ( Yt (1) −Yt (0) )Qt | Dt = 1], and the probability that a
sampled period is during the conspiracy, or E[ Dt ]. 7
6 Note that this assumption is justified if the decision to initiate and
cease a conspiracy is based largely on factors captured by the covariates, Xt, or if it is based on idiosyncratic factors that are unrelated to
the gains from conspiracy. It is not justified if the decision to initiate
or cease a conspiracy is based on unmeasured factors affecting butfor prices, i.e., vt, or on the gains to conspiracy, i.e., ut–vt.
7 In some applications, price will be modeled in logs, in which case the
object of interest may be redefined as E[ Dt Qt {lnYt (1) −lnYt (0) }Yt (0)]
or E[ Dt Qt {lnYt (1) −lnYt (0) }Yt (1)], for example.
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3 T
 he Dummy Variable and
Forecasting Approaches
One standard approach to the evaluation of overcharges
estimates a regression model for the entire period for which
data are available, and evaluates damages by looking at
the statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficient on a dummy variable that distinguishes the impact
period from the control period. When using this dummy
variable approach, a secondary issue arises. Should one
evaluate damages by assuming a constant price differential through the impact period (as suggested by the coefficient on the dummy variable) or should one allow for
non-constant price effects of the alleged conspiracy?
When the time period or periods in which the alleged
antitrust behavior affected prices is sufficiently long
and the necessary data are available, a second standard
approach to the evaluation of overcharges is a two-step
procedure. First, one estimates a regression model that
“explains” prices using only data for the control period
in which the market was unimpeded. Second, the regression model is used to predict but-for prices in the impact
period.8 This approach is conventionally referred to as a
forecasting (or “before-after”) approach.
To apply the dummy variable approach, we estimate Equation (1) for the entire time period. The estimation may or may not use quantity weights.9 When
the estimation does use quantity weights, we assume
that the model is correctly specified in the sense that
the earlier orthogonality conditions are modified to be
0 = E[ εtQt ] = E[ εt XtQt ] = E[ εt DtQt ] = E[ εt Dt XtQt ].
Continuing to assume that the impact of the covariates
on price is unaffected by the conspiracy, δ measures the
temporally constant effect of the conspiracy on price per
unit of time. More generally, the impact of the covariates
on price may be correlated with the conspiracy, although
not directly caused by it. Estimates of average overcharges
are a quantity-weighted average of the difference in prices
with and without the conspiracy, or
 = 1 D Q { Yˆ (1) −Yˆ (0) }
OC
∑
1
t
T t =1 t t t
T



(5)

8 There must be sufficiently variability to allow one to appropriately
account for non-collusive variables that might have affected price in
the impact period.
9 A variety of considerations are involved in the decision of whether
to use quantity weights, including data quality, heteroskedasticity, efficiency, strong trends in quantity (particularly for narrowly
defined products), and robustness, among others. We focus on the
case where weights are not used, but note the implications of using
weights where relevant.
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ˆ + ˆβ′Xt are the
ˆ + ( ˆβ′ + ˆγ′ ) Xt + ˆδ and Yˆt (0) = α
where Yˆt (1) = α
regression fitted values during the conspiracy and nonconspiracy periods, respectively.
For some purposes, it may be desirable to impose
the restriction that γ = 0 (i.e., the effect of the covariates
on price is the same in the impact period and the control
period). In this case, we would obtain a different estimate
of damages, given by
 = 1 D Q { Y (1) −Y (0) }
OC
∑
2
t
T t =1 t t t
T



(6)

where Yt (1) = α + δ + β ′Xt and Yt (0) = α + β ′Xt are the fitted
values corresponding to the conspiracy and non-conspiracy periods, respectively, where all coefficients are
estimated subject to the restriction that the interaction
between covariates and the conspiracy period dummy is
properly excluded from the regression, i.e., that γ = 0. Our


main focus is on OC 1 , but we discuss OC 2 in Section 6.
Note that both of these estimators can be rewritten in terms
of sample means and estimated regression coefficients,
T
 =π
 =π
ˆ 1 δ , where π
ˆ 1 = 1 ∑ t=1DtQt
ˆ 1ˆδ+ π
ˆ ′X ˆγ and OC
i.e., OC
1
2
T
1 T
ˆ X = ∑ t=1DtQt Xt . 10
and π
T
Because the regression model in Equation (1) interacts
the covariates with the dummy for conspiracy, the coefficients α̂ and β̂ can be obtained equivalently by running
a regression of price on covariates during the non-conspirˆ + ˆβ′Xt are then
acy period alone. The fitted values Yˆt (0) = α
the in-sample predictions for periods t with Dt = 0 and the
out-of-sample forecasts for periods t with Dt = 1. The forecasting approach to estimating average overcharges takes
the quantity-weighted difference between actual and forecasted prices, or
 = 1 D Q { Y −Yˆ (0) }
FC
∑
T t =1 t t t t
T



(7)

As with the dummy variable approach, the forecasting approach estimate can be rewritten in terms of
sample means and the estimated regression coefficients,
1 T
= π
ˆ Y = ∑ t=1DtQtYt . In the
ˆY −π
ˆ 1α
ˆ −π
ˆ ′X ˆβ, where π
i.e., FC
T
next section, we discuss the issues involved in choosing
between the two approaches.
10 As noted by Wooldridge (2002, section 18.3.1), covariates can
be de-meaned prior to estimation without changing the estimated
regression coefficients except for the constant and with essentially
negligible effects on the standard errors. This means that we can enˆ X is by construction zero, which is computationally consure that π
venient. In that case, the coefficient on the dummy variable needs
.
only to be scaled up by π̂ 1 in order to obtain OC
1
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4 W
 hen Do These Two Approaches
Differ?
Equation (1) was introduced as a description of the true
relationship between the outcome, the conspiracy period,
and the covariates. A related interpretation of Equation (1)
is as an in-sample decomposition of prices into predicted
and unexplained components. Specifically, we have
ˆ + ˆβ′Xt + ˆδDt + ˆγ′Dt Xt +ˆεt
Yt = α



(8)

where ˆεt is a fitted price residual which in the sample has
zero correlation with the covariates by construction. We
can use this decomposition to connect the forecasting and
the dummy variable approaches.
Lemma: When quantity varies over the conspiracy
period and the regression is unweighted, the forecasting
and dummy variable approaches will differ, depending on
whether or not quantity is correlated in the sample with
the fitted residual during the conspiracy period. Formally,
 + 1 D Q ˆε
 = OC
FC
∑
1
T t =1 t t t
T

The Lemma establishes that the difference between
the forecasting and dummy variable approaches hinges
on whether the quantity of sales would affect price in the
regression model. Classical demand theory would suggest
that when price is unexpectedly high (i.e., when εt is high)
that quantity is likely to be low. Hence, one presumption is that the forecasting estimate of overcharges will
be negatively biased relative to the dummy variable estimate of overcharges. However, note that Equation (1) is not
typically interpreted as an inverse demand equation, but
rather a reduced form model for price. Consequently, there
may be no economic basis for the assumption that quantity
and unexplained price deviations are negatively related.
Proposition 1: The forecasting and dummy variable
approaches yield numerically identical overcharge estimates if either (a) quantity is constant over the conspiracy
period, or (b) the regression in Equation (1) is quantity
weighted.
Proposition 1 follows directly from the Lemma. If
quantity is constant, then the difference between the two
1 T
approaches is proportional to ∑ t=1Dtˆεt , which is zero by
T
the sample orthogonality conditions of regression. If the
1 T
regression is quantity weighted, then
∑ D Q ˆε is
T t =1 t t t
zero since that is then precisely the sample orthonality

condition for the weighted regression. Proposition 1 means
that, despite often being a major point of disagreement
between opposing expert witnesses, there is no distinction between the dummy variable and forecasting method
when the two methods use the same covariates and quantity weights. Proposition 1 does not, however, indicate the
relationship between the approaches when the regression
models are not weighted by quantity, as they often will not
be, and it does not indicate whether either approach measures the parameter of interest. These considerations are
covered by the next proposition, which gives a variety of
sufficient conditions for the dummy variable and forecasting approaches to be consistent for average overcharges.
Three of these sufficient conditions are more detailed than
the others, and we discuss them briefly before stating the
proposition. These three assumptions, which pertain
to the covariance during the conspiracy period between
quantity and unmeasured factors influencing actual or
but-for prices, are given by:
Assumption 1: C[ ut , Qt | Dt = 1] = C[ vt , Qt | Dt = 1] = 0.
Assumption 2: C[ ut , Qt | Dt = 1] = C[ vt , Qt | Dt = 1].
Assumption 1′: C[ vt , Qt | Dt = 1] = 0.
Since ut corresponds to Yt(1) and vt corresponds to
Yt(0), Assumption 1 asserts zero covariance between quantity and unmeasured factors affecting but-for and actual
prices during the conspiracy. Assumption 2 asserts that
the covariance during the conspiracy between quantity
and unmeasured factors affecting but-for price is equal
to the covariance during the conspiracy between quantity and unmeasured factors affecting actual price. That
is, the covariance does not have to be zero, but it must
be the same for actual and but-for prices.11 Assumption 1′
implies that there is zero covariance between quantity and
the unmeasured factors affecting but-for prices during the
conspiracy. This is a weaker version of Assumption 1, in
the mathematical sense of being implied by it. Assumption 2 is not implied by Assumption 1′, but is implied by
Assumption 1. After stating our main proposition regarding consistency, we discuss whether there is a sense in
which Assumption 1′ is stronger than Assumption 2.
We now state our main proposition regarding
consistency.

11 As noted by the editor, Assumption 2 is also implied the somewhat
stronger restriction that C[ Yt (1) −Yt (0), Qt | Xt , Dt = 1] = 0. In words,
this restriction is that the covariance between quantity and price is
the same during the damages period as long as the covariates are the
same, regardless of whether it is with or without the conspiracy.
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Proposition 2: If (Yt, Xt, Dt, Qt)′ is a vector ergodic stationary process with existence of sufficient moments, then
both the forecasting and dummy variable approaches
are consistent for OC* if either (a) quantity is constant
over the conspiracy period or (b) the regression in Equation (1) is quantity weighted. In addition, the forecasting
approach is consistent if Assumption 1 or Assumption 1′
is met, and the dummy variable approach is consistent if
Assumption 1 or Assumption 2 is met.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the appendix.12
The primary conclusion of the Proposition is that both
the forecasting and the dummy variable approaches can
be consistent for average overcharges, but under slightly
different conditions in general.13 Whether Assumption 2 or
Assumption 1′ is more plausible is a matter of judgment,
as neither implies the other. Assumption 1 asserts that
quantity is uncorrelated with unmeasured factors affecting both actual and but-for prices during the conspiracy.
This is plainly a strong assumption, in the sense that it
implies both Assumptions 2 and 1′.
Assumption 2 is notably weaker. This assumption
allows for quantity to be correlated with unmeasured
factors affecting actual and but-for price during the conspiracy; it is justified if adjustments to quantity are due to
observable factors controlled for in the regression and idiosyncratic variation. Stated differently, Assumption 2 is justified if adjustments to quantity ignore the unobservable
price improvements available from conspiracy, i.e., ut–vt.
Turning to Assumption 1′, we find it hard to justify
the assumption that there is zero covariance during the
conspiracy period between quantity and the unmeasured
factors affecting the but-for price, without also being
willing to assume that there is zero covariance between
quantity and actual price. That is, it seems to us to be hard
to justify Assumption 1′ without appealing to Assumption 1.
Consequently, in our judgment, there is a sense in which
Assumption 1′ is stronger than Assumption 2, despite the
12 Informally, an ergodic stationary process is a process that will not
change its properties over time and whose properties can be deduced
from a sufficiently long sample of the process.
13 While it is not our focus in this paper, we note that if one found
Assumption 1 to be justified, then there are two consistent estimators
for average overcharges, in which case a more efficient estimator can
be obtained by combining the two estimators. For example, the lin

ear combination ( ω1 OC 1 + ω2 FC ) /( ω1 + ω2 ) is also consistent for the
average overcharge and has asymptotic variance of 1/(ω1+ω2) where
ω1 ≡ 1/( VOC − c ) with VOC the asymptotic variance of the dummy
1
1
variable estimate and c the asymptotic covariance between it and the
forecasting estimate, and ω2≡1/(VFC–c) with VFC the asymptotic variance of the forecasting estimate. On the other hand, obtaining good
estimates of VFC and VOC is challenging and this may limit the practi1
cality of this approach.
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fact that neither assumption implies the other, strictly
speaking. Note that there is a natural restriction which
implies that unmeasured factors affecting price would be
the same under conspiracy and non-conspiracy conditions: vt = ut = εt. In words, this would imply that treatment
effects would depend on covariates at best, but not residuals. In this case, Assumption 2 is satisfied automatically,
but Assumption 1′ may not be. Proposition 2 suggests,
therefore, that the dummy variable approach is likely to
be more robust than the forecasting approach.

5 Should One Forecast?
In this section, we discuss the potential advantages and
disadvantages of the forecasting approach.
Advocates of the forecasting approach sometimes use
sophisticated model selection procedures to choose the
regression model. One motivation for this approach is that
the model selection process is based purely on data prior to
the conspiracy period and will therefore not be corrupted
by any effects that the conspiracy might have had on the
covariates in the conspiracy period. There is an important
benefit associated with this approach, but there is a further
drawback. The benefit is that an appropriate model searching methodology minimizes the scope for “overfitting” and
“cherrypicking”.14 If data during the conspiracy period are
used to choose the regression model, then there is a risk
that the model will produce a biased damages estimate,
which is inappropriate. For example, it is always possible
to use an in-sample model selection procedure to produce
a damages estimate of zero, just by adding a sufficient
number of irrelevant covariates so that the model fully
explains prices in the conspiracy period (“overfitting”).
Choosing the model that is most beneficial to a particular position (“cherrypicking”) can also be a problem.
If an expert knows the damages estimate that is beneficial
to the client, there is a risk that in-sample model selection
could be tantamount to choosing the model that generates
a damages estimate that is most preferred. A forecasting
approach that is based on an appropriate model selection
methodology serves as a good disciplining device.
The drawback of using data prior to the conspiracy
period to select the model is that it may be too disciplining.
In particular, the use of only pre-conspiracy data prevents
the expert from selecting a model using all of his or her
knowledge of the economics of the problem. Particularly
14 This is a benefit emphasized by White, Marshall, and Kennedy
(2006).
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in dynamic markets, the relationship between covariates
and prices may be so rapidly evolving that the pre-conspiracy period will not be an especially good guide to model
selection for the conspiracy period. In such a setting, prior
knowledge may be of great value, and the expert may
want to use such knowledge. Suppose, for example, that
the market at issue is a highly innovative one in which
new technologies are developed on average every 2 years,
and also that the rate of innovation is growing over time.
Suppose also that the conspiracy period is 4 years long.
Then, the forecasting approach is likely to underestimate
the extent to which innovation would likely have occurred
in the but-for world during the conspiracy period.
Weighing these considerations, some would conclude
that the model selection procedure associated with forecasting is on balance desirable, especially when damages
do not involve dynamic markets. A point which is perhaps
underappreciated, however, is that one could of course
choose the model based only on data prior to conspiracy
conditions, as with forecasting, and then having chosen
a model, estimate the parameters of the model using the
dummy variable approach.

6 S
 aving Degrees of Freedom in the
Dummy Variable Model
An important consideration in the dummy variable model
is whether overcharges can be estimated with greater
precision by imposing the restriction γ = 0. Imposing this
restriction could in principle either increase or decrease
the variability of the overcharges estimate, as we now
explain.
ˆ X , the variances of the the
Conditional on π̂ 1 and π
two dummy variable approaches are
 |π
ˆ 1, π
ˆ X ] =π
ˆ 12 V [ ˆδ| π
ˆ 1, π
ˆ X ]+π
ˆ ′X V [ ˆγ | π
ˆ 1, π
ˆX]
V [ OC
1
ˆ
ˆ +2π
ˆ ′ C [ ˆγ , δ| π
ˆ ,π
ˆ ]π
ˆ
π
X

X

1

X

1

 |π
ˆ 1, π
ˆ X ] =π
ˆ 12 V [ δ | π
ˆ 1, π
ˆX]
V [ OC
2





(9)
(10)

Recall that δ̂ is the dummy variable coefficient from the
regression including interactions between the dummy
variable and the covariates, that γ̂ is the vector of coefficients on those interactions, and that δ is the dummy
variable coefficient from the regression that excludes the
interactions. Using the fact that δ̂ and δ are connected
η where the kth element of η̂ is the coeffias δ = ˆδ+ ˆγ′ˆ,
cient on Dt in a regression of the kth element of DtXt on a

constant, Dt, and Xt, where Xt has K elements, we can write
 =π
ˆ 1ˆδ+ π
ˆ 1ˆη′ˆγ. Consequently, these two approaches
OC
2

ˆ
γ OC
differ in the implicit adjustment to ˆ;
1 uses π X and

ˆ
ˆ.
OC 2 uses π 1 η
Comparing equations (9) and (10), one can see that
it is not possible to determine a priori whether imposing
the restriction that γ = 0 will improve efficiency. To see why,
consider the three terms in Equation (9). The first term is
ˆ 1, π
ˆ X ]. However, this can be either
proportional to V [ ˆδ| π
ˆ 1, π
ˆ X ]. 15 The second term in
larger or smaller than V [ δ | π
Equation (9), summarizing the variability in the estimate
of the change in the effect of the covariates on price, is
strictly positive and typically will be large. The reason is
that a precise estimate of the change in the effect of the
covariates on price requires sufficient variation in the
covariates both before and during the alleged conspiracy.
Often, covariates that are suspected to have a substantial
effect on prices are notably different during the alleged
conspiracy period, and there is insufficient variation in the
key covariates prior to the alleged conspiracy to obtain a
good estimate. The final term in Equation (9), pertaining to
the covariance between the change in the level of price and
the change in the effect of covariates, can consist of terms
which are all positive, all negative, or a mixture of signs.
With this background, we can now motivate the
conclusion that the variance associated with the first
approach to overcharges can either be larger or smaller
than the variance associated with the second approach.
ˆ 1, π
ˆ X ] is larger than V [ δ | π
ˆ 1, π
ˆ X ] (as for
Even if V [ ˆδ| π
example when γ = 0), the third and final term in Equation
(9) can be negative and large in magnitude.16 This leads
to indeterminacy in the relative magnitudes of the conditional variances of the two approaches, and this indeterminacy carries over to the case of unconditional variances.
On the other hand, it is often possible to estimate
the model using both the first and second dummary variable approaches. Assuming the economist is willing to
impose the additional assumptions needed for inference
(e.g., existence and finiteness of fourth moments or the
15 Higgins and Johnson (2003) consider some restrictions that guarˆ 1, π
ˆ X ]< V [ ˆδ| π
ˆ 1, π
ˆ X ], chief among these being γ = 0. This
antee V [ δ | π
is an old result; see for example Kmenta (2000, section 11–2).
16 To the best of our knowledge, there is no parametric restriction
that guarantees an improvement in precision of estimated average
overcharges from imposing the restriction γ = 0. For example, even in
data generating processes where γ = 0, it can still be more efficient to
allow for a change in the effect of the covariates on price. Because of
this, we are not aware of any statistical test that would clearly point
to whether it was more appropriate to include or exclude the interaction term from the regression, from the point of view of minimizing
the variability of the overcharge estimate.
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variance structure of the error term), it may be possible to
get a sense in the sample of which estimator is more variable. However, probably the strongest reasons to consider
both the first and second dummy variable approaches are
prior information, specific data settings, and robustness.
The economist might be have a strong prior view that one or
more covariates have the same partial effect on price before
and during the conspiracy (i.e., an element of γ is zero)
and suspect that imposing the restriction will improve efficiency; the economist may not have enough observations to
estimate the effect of variables believed to be important in
both the before and during periods; or the economist might
have enough data to do so, but be worried about the robustness of a model that is deemed close to overfitting.

7 An Example
In this section, we present the results of a simulation
study intended to demonstrate the practical relevance of
the issues discussed above. We set T = 100, with the alleged
conspiracy period beginning roughly two-thirds of the
way through the sample, i.e., Dt = 1(t > t*), where for each
sample t* is a single draw from the binomial distribution
with parameters T and 2/3. This implies that E[ Dt ] = 2 / 3.
The covariate Xt is generated according to
Xt = 1–0.015t+0.25Xt–1+et(11)
where we initialize Xt as X0 = 0 and et is distributed independently and identically (iid) standard normal. This specification allows for trend and persistence in the covariate.
The AR(1) with trend model can exhibit notable (spurious)
correlations with the dummy for the conspiracy period.
That is, the conspiracy does not cause changes to Xt but
may be associated with it. This mimics real world settings
in which these methods are used. It will often appear
that one or several covariates move differently before the
alleged conspiracy period than during, but these apparent
differences will potentially be consistent with a complex
time series process underlying one or more covariates and
with spurious correlation between the covariates and the
outcome variable during the alleged conspiracy period.
We simulate prices according to Equations (2) and (3),
with ut and vt independent heteroskedastic error terms
generated as ut = Zt ut and vt = Zt vt , where ut and vt are
distributed iid bivariate normal with means of 0, variances 10, and correlation of zero, and Zt is distributed iid
standard normal and independent of ut , vt , and et. We
also (arbitrarily) choose the following model parameters:
α = 10, β = 2 (there is one covariate), δ = 4, and γ is equal to
either 0 or 1. In summary, the model for price is given by:
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Yt = 10+2Xt+4Dt+γDtXt+εt(12)
where εt = Dtut+(1–Dt)vt. In a typical simulated sample from
this data generating process, a regression of Yt on Xt, Dt,
and DtXt yields an R2 of about one-third, which is typical
of this context.
As emphasized by Proposition 2, the relationship
between quantity of sales and unmeasured factors affecting actual and but-for prices during the conspiracy period
relates in highly specific ways to the consistency of the forecasting and dummy variable approaches. Consequently,
we consider several different specifications for quantity.
Our baseline specification holds quantity constant at 150,
where quantity is measured in thousands of units sold. We
also consider more complicated specifications based on an
AR(1) model with an error term that depends on unmeasured factors affecting actual and but-for prices:
Qt = 75+0.5Qt–1+vuut+vvvt+et(13)
with Qt initialized to Q0 = 0. We let et be distributed iid standard normal, and εt, et, and et be mutually independent.
The coefficients vu and vv in Equation (13) control
whether Assumptions 1, 2, or 1′ are met, or whether none
of them are met. The coefficient γ controls whether interaction terms are needed in the regression model. Table 1
shows the models for Qt that we consider, the configurations of the vu, vv, and γ parameters, and the implications
of these choices for the validity of Assumptions 1, 2, and 1′
and for estimator consistency.
Model 1 generates price Yt according to Equation (12),
with γ = 0. This corresponds to a setting in which the effect
of the covariate on price is the same before and during
the alleged conspiracy. Quantity is constant at 150,000
units. Model 2 is identical to the first, but sets γ = 1. This
implies an increase in the partial correlation between
the covariate and price during the conspiracy period, as
compared to before. Models 3 through 6 allow quantity
to vary according to Equation (13), but the parameters vu
and vv vary from being equal and zero (Model 3), to being
equal and non-zero (Model 4), to being different from one
another (Models 5 and 6). In each of the six models, the
covariate Xt is simulated according to Equation (11).
Note that Models 2 through 6 involve changes to the
data generating process for Qt, but not for Yt. Thinking of the
structure of the two approaches, we recognize that changes
to the data generating process for Qt affect the forecasting
approach in a somewhat more direct way than they do the
dummy variable approach. That is, the dummy variable
ˆ X . As emphaˆ 1 , and π
ˆ , ˆβ, ˆδ, ˆγ, π
estimate is a function of α
sized by the Lemma, however, the forecasting approach is
T
additionally affected by T −1 ∑ t=1DtQtˆεt , and this means that
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Table 1 Overview of Simulation Experiments.
Model for Qt

νu

νv

Valid assumptions

γ

Consistent estimators

1

Constant

–

–

1 and 2

0

2

Constant

–

–

1 and 2

1

, OC
 , OC

FC
1
2
, OC

FC

3

AR(1)

0

0

1 and 2

1

, OC

FC
1

4

AR(1)

3

3

2

1

5

AR(1)

3

0

1′

1


OC
1

FC

6

AR(1)

0

3

None of the above

1

None of the above

Model

1

Note: The table describes the simulation experiments we conduct. Parameters νu and νv correspond to the model for Qt, and the parameter γ
corresponds to the model for Yt.
Table 2 Simulation Estimates of Mean and Standard Deviation of Estimators for Average Overcharge.
Model


OC
1


OC
2


FC

OC*

1

199.89
(47.88)
183.36
(49.27)
183.47
(49.53)
184.37
(51.95)
184.39
(51.83)
183.45
(49.66)

199.94
(46.58)
198.97
(50.44)
198.96
(50.67)
199.54
(53.24)
199.55
(53.11)
198.95
(50.80)

199.89
(47.88)
183.36
(49.27)
183.47
(49.54)
193.45
(53.06)
193.46
(52.84)
183.46
(49.76)

200.00

2
3
4
5
6

183.49
183.49
183.49
193.51
173.50

Note: The table presents simulation estimates of mean and standard deviation (parentheses) of sampling distribution for three estimators
of average overcharges. All figures are in thousands of dollars.

the probability limit of the forecasting approach depends on
the data generating process for Qt in a more direct way than
does that of the dummy variable approach.
The results of these simulation experiments are given
in Table 2, which presents estimates of the mean and
standard deviation of the estimators for average overcharge discussed, using 240,000 replications of data sets
of size T = 100. For reference, we also display the estimand,
OC*, for each simulation experiment.17 As quantity is measured in thousands of units, the dollar figures in the table
are in thousands of dollars. Since T = 100 here, aggregate
17 For Models 1 through 4 we have E[( ut -vt )Dt Qt ] = 0 and the estimand reduces to π1δ+π′Xγ, but for Models 5 and 6 the estimand is
more complicated to calculate. In all instances, we approximate the
estimand by taking 7.2 million samples of size 100 and averaging the
100
1
sample means
∑ D Q { Y ( 1 ) -Yt ( 0)}. The margin of error for
100 t=1 t t t
the simulation estimate of the estimand is ± 0.03 for Models 1, 5, and
6, and ± 0.02 for Models 2, 3, and 4, where we take advantage of the
fact that the estimand is the same and average the three resulting
simulation estimates.

overcharges are 100,000 times as large as the quantities
in Table 2, or roughly $20 million in each scenario. This is
a typical damages award for a small to moderate case of
this nature; in recent years, it has become common to see
damages estimates of $1 billion or more.18
While the table contains the figures for the standard
deviation of these estimators, we focus on the simulation
estimates of bias. This is because in all six models, and many
others we have examined, differences in standard deviation
among the methods are generally minor, as compared with
18 Freed (2012) notes that “[e]stimates of the potential cost of a settlement of the [Visa] antitrust case vary dramatically – from a few
billion dollars into the hundreds of billions.” Visa eventually settled
for $4 billion (Touryalai 2012). Other settlement amounts are cited in
Marshall (2008), Schoenberger (2009), and Clark (2011). The only review ever conducted along these lines looked at 40 cases (Lande and
Davis 2008). The average recovery for plaintiffs among those 40 was
$450 million under one set of assumptions and $491 million under
another set of assumptions, but the cases studied were those known
to prominent antitrust attorneys and hence more likely to be ones
involving large dollar amounts.
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differences in bias. The simulation estimates of the standard deviation of each estimator are nonetheless of interest
for computing the margin of error of the estimated means of
ˆ / R,
the sampling distributions. These are given by ±1.96 σ
where σ̂ is the estimated standard deviation of the sampling distribution and R is the number of replications, here
240,000.19 For each of the three estimators and for each
model, the margin of error for the mean is roughly ±0.2.
Model 1 corresponds to a setting of constant quantity
and no interaction term in the population between covariates and the dummy variable. For this model, Proposition 1

asserts that the first dummy variable approach ( OC 1 )
 ) are numerically idenand the forecasting approach ( FC
tical. This is borne out in the simulations. In each of the
240,000 replications, the first dummy variable approach
and the forecasting approach are identical. The simulation
estimated means, presented in the first row of the table,
are thus also identical. Because the effect of covariates on
price is constant in Model 1, the discussion in Section 6
indicates that there should be no important difference
between the two varieties of the dummy variable approach:
the first approach allows the effect of covariates on price
to change during the alleged conspiracy, and the second
 ) correctly imposes the assumption that
approach ( OC
2
the effect of covariates on price is the same over time (i.e.,
that γ = 0). Consistent with our expectation, the two dummy
variable approaches perform quite similarly in terms of
bias. It is interesting to note that the second dummy variable approach is not particularly precise relative to the
first. This will not be true in every setting, as imposing true
restrictions can often improve efficiency. Overall, for all
three estimators, the simulation estimates of the means are
extremely close to the target parameter of $200,000.
Model 2 modifies the data generating process to allow
the effect of covariates on price to change during the alleged
conspiracy period. In this setting, since quantity is constant
as in the first model, the first dummy variable approach and
the forecasting approach are identical. However, because
the effect of the covariates changes during the alleged
conspiracy period, the second dummy variable approach
(which imposes the constraint that γ=0) is inferior to the
first approach. Table 2 shows that the second dummy variable approach has a bias of approximately $15,000, or just
over 8% of the true parameter of $183,000.
19 This margin of error may be justified either by appealing to the
central limit theorem applied to the estimators, or to normality of the
sampling distribution of each estimator. A detailed examination of
the sampling distribution confirms that for these simulation experiments, the sampling distribution is approximately normal. For example, each estimator in each model exhibits skewness of roughly 0.2
and kurtosis of roughly 3.2.
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Model 3 allows quantity to vary according to Equation (13) and retains the assumption that the effect of the
covariate on prices differs before and during the alleged
conspiracy period. However, this model does not allow any
predictable relationship between quantity and price, either
under conspiracy conditions or under non-conspiracy
conditions. That is, this model conforms to Assumption 1,
which implies Assumption 2 holds as well. Proposition 2
implies that both the first dummy variable approach and
the forecasting approach should be consistent for average
overcharges in this setting. The simulation experiments
corroborate this. While it is no longer true that the first
dummy variable approach and the forecasting approach
are numerically identical, their sampling distributions
are nearly identical. In particular, the mean of the two
sampling distributions differs in the third decimal place
and the standard deviation differs in the second decimal
place. Since both distributions are essentially normal, and
since the first two moments are essentially identical, it is
hard to prefer one estimator over the other in this context
on statistical grounds. However, because the effect of the
covariates changes over time, the second dummy variable approach is not consistent, with a bias that is again
roughly 8% of the true parameter.
Model 4 is the same as Model 3, except for a change
to the parameters in Equation (13), which governs quantity. In particular, this model now allows for quantity to
be related to unmeasured factors affecting price, which
violates Assumption 1. However, by restricting the correlation to be equal under conspiracy and non-conspiracy
conditions, Assumption 2 is met. As noted, an easy way
to understand this setting is that quantity may be related
to but-for prices, but not to the gains from conspiracy. As
indicated by the schematic in Table 1, the only consistent estimator in this setting is the first dummy variable
approach. The simulation experiments bear this prediction out, with both the second dummy variable approach
and the forecasting approach being badly biased, by
roughly 8 and 5% of the true parameter, respectively. In
contrast, the first dummy variable approach has a sampling distribution mean that is less than one-half of 1%
above the true parameter.20
20 While the effect is small, we were somewhat surprised that the
first dummy variable approach was not as close to the target in this
model as it was in Models 1, 2, and 3. We note that the conclusion of
Proposition 2 is not that the estimator is unbiased, but rather that it
is consistent. On the other hand, we conducted a similar experiment
with a slightly larger sample size of T = 200 and encountered similar
results – a simulation estimate of the mean that is roughly one-half of
1% above the true parameter, where the true parameter is not inside
the confidence region for the simulation estimate.
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Model 5 highlights the performance of these estimators when Assumption 1′ is met but Assumption 2 is
violated. In this new context, the estimand is no longer
$183,000, but is instead $194,000. The simulation experiments confirm the prediction of Proposition 2; now only
the forecasting approach performs well in terms of proximity to the true parameter. The first and second dummy
variable approaches have biases of approximately –5 and
3%, respectively. On the other hand, as discussed, we
find it difficult to imagine a real-world justification for
Assumption 1′ that would not also imply the validity of
Assumption 1, and so this model may be viewed as somewhat artificial.
Finally, Model 6 emphasizes that there is no guarantee that one of these these approaches will estimate
average overcharges successfully. Now, the parameters
of Equation (13) are such that neither Assumption 1, nor
Assumption 2, nor Assumption 1′ is met. In this context,
the true parameter is $174,000 and the first and second
dummy variable approaches have approximate biases of
6 and 15%, respectively, and the forecasting approach has
an approximate bias of 6%.

8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed two major approaches
to the estimation of overcharges: the dummy variable
approach and the forecasting approach. The dummy
variable approach is based on a regression model that
explains price before and during the alleged conspiracy
period. There are two leading variants of the dummy
variable approach, corresponding to whether the effects
of covariates are allowed to differ before and during the
alleged conspiracy period, or are instead imposed to be the
same throughout. We consider both of these variants. The
forecasting approach formulates a model for price before
the alleged conspiracy period and then compares price
forecasts with actual prices. For both the dummy variable approach and the forecasting approach, a quantityweighted difference between prices under conspiracy and
non-conspiracy conditions is used to estimate overcharges.
We show that the first dummy variable approach,
in which the effects of covariates are allowed to differ

over time, is numerically equivalent to the forecasting approach when quantity is constant or when the
regressions themselves are quantity-weighted. When
quantity varies over time, but not in a manner related
to unobserved determinants of price, then both the
forecasting and the first dummy variable approaches
generate consistent estimates of overcharges. However,
when quantity is related to unobserved determinants
of price, one sufficient condition leads to consistency
of the forecasting approach and another sufficient
condition leads to consistency of the first dummy variable approach. Neither of these sufficient conditions is
implied by the other. However, we have argued that the
sufficient condition for consistency of the forecasting
approach in this case is somewhat artificial, suggesting
slightly greater robustness of the first dummy variable
approach.
We also show that there is some justification for the
second dummy variable approach. When the effects of
covariates on price are indeed constant over time, then
the second dummy variable approach can have less variability than the first dummy variable approach. However,
this is not guaranteed. Moreover, in simulation results, we
do not find important differences in the variability of the
two dummy variable approaches. On the other hand, if the
restriction that the effects of covariates are constant is, in
fact, false, then the second dummy variable approach can
be biased.
Overall, our discussion points to a particularly important role for the first dummy variable approach, particularly when there are sufficient data to estimate the model
reliably. The primary drawback of the first dummy variable approach is the possibility that analysts will “overfit”
the regression model, including a great number of covariates that do not belong in the regression model. This can
lead to imprecise overcharges estimates, and perhaps
even spurious overcharges estimates if inappropriate
covariates are included. To ameliorate these problems, we
suggest that further consideration be given to the use of
a model selection procedure (such as that currently used
in the forecasting approach) in conjunction with the first
dummy variable approach.
Previously published online October 26, 2013

Appendix
Before proving the lemma and propositions, we replicate
the key equations from the text and give a synopsis of

the maintained assumptions underlying them. Recall the
definitions
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OC * = E[ { Yt (1) −Yt (0) } DtQt ]



(A.1)

Yt(1) = α+δ+(β+γ)′Xt+ut 

(A.2)

Yt(0) = α+β′Xt+vt 

(A.3)

ˆ + ˆδ+ ( ˆβ + ˆγ ) ′ Xt
Yˆt (1) = α
ˆ + ˆβ′Xt
Yˆt (0) = α

(A.4)



(A.5)



 = 1 { Y −Yˆ (0) } D Q = π
ˆY −π
ˆ 1α
ˆ −π
ˆ ′X ˆβ
FC
∑
t t
T t =1 t t
T

 = 1 { Yˆ (1) −Yˆ (0) } D Q = π
ˆ 1ˆδ+ π
ˆ ′X ˆγ
OC
∑
1
t
t t
T t=1 t

(A.6)



T

(A.7)



and the decomposition into fitted values and fitted
residuals:
ˆ + ˆβ′Xt + ˆδDt + ˆγ′Dt Xt +ˆεt
Yt = α

(A.8)



In a context where the regression models are
unweighted, we assume
0 = E[ ut ] = E[ ut Dt ] = E[ ut Xt ] = E[ ut Dt Xt ]
0 = E[ vt ] = E[ vt Dt ] = E[ vt Xt ] = E[ vt Dt Xt ]

(A.9)



(A.10)



These assumptions imply that the regression residuals εt = utDt+vt(1–Dt) satisfy 0 = E[ εt ] = E[ εt Xt ] = E[ εt Dt ]
=E[ εt Dt Xt ], i.e., that α+β′Xt+δDt+γ′DtXt is the best linear
predictor of Yt = DtYt(1)+(1–Dt)Yt(0) given Xt, Dt, and DtXt.
When the regression models are weighted, we modify the
assumptions above to
0 = E[ utQt ] = E[ ut DtQt ] = E[ ut XtQt ] = E[ ut Dt XtQt ]
0 = E[ vtQt ] = E[ vt DtQt ] = E[ vt XtQt ] = E[ vt Dt XtQt ]




(A.11)
(A.12)

In other words, we assume that, when the economist
chooses to weight, weighting is in fact appropriate. We
now prove the lemma and propositions from the main
text.
Proof of Lemma: Using Equations (A.5), (A.6), and (A.8),
we have
T
1 T
 = 1 D Q ( ˆδD + ˆγ D X +ˆε ) = π
ˆ ′X ˆγ + ∑DtQtˆεt
FC
′ t t t ˆ 1ˆδ+ π
∑
t t
t
T t =1
T t =1
T
1
+
= OC
1
∑D Q ˆε .

T t =1 t t t

□

Proof of Proposition 1: Applying the Lemma, note
that when quantity is constant, say Qt = Q , we have
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1 T
1 T
∑ D Q ˆε =Q T ∑ t=1Dtˆεt =0 by the orthogonality of
T t =1 t t t
fitted residuals and covariates. The same holds for a
weighted regression, but the orthogonality condition is
1 T
then precisely that ∑ t=1DtQtˆεt = 0. 
□
T
Proof of Proposition 2: The assumption that (Yt, Xt,
Dt, Qt) is a vector ergodic stationary process with existence of sufficient moments implies that moments such
as E[ DtQtYt ] exist, are finite, and are time invariant;
and also that the corresponding sample mean converges
in probability to that expectation. Together with Equations (A.9) and (A.10), this implies that the regression
ˆ , ˆβ, ˆδ, and γ̂ are consistent for α, β, δ,
coefficients α
ˆ 1, π
ˆ X , and
and γ, respectively, and that the averages π
ˆ Y are consistent for π 1 ≡E[ DtQt ], π X ≡E[ DtQt Xt ], and
π
πY ≡E[ DtQtYt ], respectively.
To discuss consistency, it is helpful to characterize
the estimand under our assumptions. We utilize two such
characterizations, one for the forecasting approach and
the other for the dummy variable approach. That for the
forecasting approach is given by
OC * = E[ Yt (1) DtQt ] − E[ Yt (0) DtQt ] = E[ Yt DtQt ]

=− E[ ( α + β′Xt + vt ) DtQt ] = πY − π 1 α − π′X β − E[ vt DtQt ]

To see how this characterization is related to
consistency of the forecasting approach, note that
= π
ˆY −π
ˆ 1α
ˆ −π
ˆ ′X ˆβ converges in probability to πY–π1α–
FC
π′X β by continuity of probability limits. So consistency of

FC
for OC* follows if
E[ vt DtQt ] = 0
Sufficient conditions for this conclusion include:
quantity is constant at Q as then E[ vt DtQt ] = QE[ vt Dt ]
[cf., Equation (A.10)]; the regression is quantity-weighted
[cf., Equation (A.12)]; or the covariance during the conspiracy between quantity and unmeasured influences
on the but-for price is zero, i.e., 0 = C[ vt , Qt | Dt = 1],
since by the law of total probability we have
E[ vt DtQt ] = E[ Dt ] E[ vtQt | Dt = 1] = E[ Dt ] C[ vt , Qt | Dt = 1]
(cf., Assumptions 1 and 1′).
Turning to the dummy variable approach, we give our
second characterization of the estimand. We have
OC * = E[ { δ+ γ′Xt + ut − vt } DtQt ]= δπ 1 + γ ′π X + E[( ut − vt ) DtQt ]
(A.13)
To see how this characterization is related to consistency of the dummy variable approach, note that
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 = ˆδπ
ˆ 1 + ˆγ′π
ˆ X converges in probability to δπ1+γ′πX by
OC
1
continuity of probability limits. So consistency of the
dummy variable approach follows if
E[( ut − vt ) DtQt ] = 0
Sufficient conditions for this conclusion include:
quantity is constant at Q [cf., Equations (A.9) and (A.10)];
the regression is quantity-weighted [cf., Equations (A.11)

and (A.12)]; the covariance between quantity and unmeasured influences on price during the conspiracy is zero, both
for actual price and for but-for prices (cf., Assumption 1);
or the covariance during the conspiracy between quantity
and unmeasured influences on price would have been the
same for actual and but-for price, since by the logic above
E[( ut − vt ) DtQt ] = E[ Dt ]{ C[ ut , Qt | Dt = 1] − C[ vt , Qt | Dt = 1] }
(cf., Assumption 2). 

□
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